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Mergers of Germany's natural gas market areas: Is transmission 
capacity booked efficiently? 
 





In the past, networks of natural gas transmission system operators (TSOs) determined the gas market 
areas in the European Union. However, gas markets mergers introduce the possibility to book the 
transmission capacity of alternative TSOs. One necessary condition for competition among TSOs is 
the absence of restrictions in capacity booking. This paper analyses whether this holds for Germany. 
As German TSOs distinguish a number of capacity types to deal with network constraints, market 
mergers have created transport alternatives for only 32% of cross-border capacity products. In almost 
all cases, we find that gas transmission network users make efficient booking decisions. 
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As part of the European Union’s (hereafter: EU) policy to establish an internal market, the EU aims to 
create a European internal gas market (European Union 2012). To achieve this, measures directed at 
national energy policies, regulatory frameworks, and the design of gas markets in Member States are 
laid out in three so-called European Energy Packages entering into force in 1998, 2003, and 2009, 
respectively. These regulations aim at liberalising the EU gas markets and establishing wholesale 
markets. In particular, they impose regulatory provisions to ensure non-discriminatory network access 
and network tariffs, and unbundling rules on network infrastructure companies. In gas wholesale 
markets, transmission system networks provide the key infrastructure. These networks are operated by 
transmission system operators (hereafter: TSOs), and are connected to networks of adjacent TSOs as 
well as to storage facilities and downstream distribution system networks. The networks are used by 
producers, traders, and suppliers (collectively, network users). Since transmission networks are the 
backbone of gas markets, regulating TSOs means regulating the entire gas market. 
In the past, suppliers had to book network capacities according to the actual transport route in 
order to supply a customer. This changed after the introduction of entry-exit systems, also referred to 
as market areas, which decoupled the physical network from the commercial trade of gas.1 Network 
users are now able to inject gas at any entry point of the physical network in a market area and 
withdraw gas at any exit point that belongs to the same market area. The management of physical gas 
flows within a market area is the responsibility of the TSOs. This decoupling also allows wholesale 
markets to arise because injecting and withdrawing gas are independent of each other and independent 
of any predefined transport routes (CEER 2011; Lohmann 2009). Nevertheless, wholesale markets 
have not fully developed (Frontier Economics Ltd., 2014), and integrating gas markets may improve 
their liquidity, and intensify the competition among gas market participants (ACER and CEER 2017).  
Market integration can be achieved by merging markets. If two markets merge, the resulting 
single gas market is based on the infrastructure of two TSOs. Market mergers have taken place mainly 
in Germany, which consisted of 41 market areas in 2006 and which were eventually merged to two 
today (Monopolkommission 2009; Ströbele et al. 2012). According to regulatory authorities, most 
European markets are still not sufficiently developed, and there are doubts about whether this will 
happen without structural reforms (ACER and CEER 2015). Hence, further market mergers, even 
across national borders, are to be expected. 
The integration of gas markets is widely discussed in the literature. For example, Asche et al. 
(2013) found a high integration of the gas markets in the UK, the Netherlands, and Belgium. 
Petrovich (2013) measured the degree of market integration for different EU gas wholesale markets 
using the wholesale prices. Kuper and Mulder (2016) focused on the integration of the German and 
Dutch gas market not only based on wholesale prices but also taking into account infrastructure 
utilisation and regulatory changes, including mergers of markets. Examining the performance of 
spatial arbitrage between the gas markets in Belgium and the UK, Massol and Banal-Estañol (2018) 
call for paying attention to possible market power of trading companies. 
Market mergers, however, do not only have an impact on wholesale markets. Networks users 
also obtain transport alternatives. Merging two markets areas, which are entry-exit systems, results in 
a new joint market area, also organised as an entry-exit system. Therefore, gas injected into the 
network of one TSO may be withdrawn from the network of the other TSO belonging to the same 
integrated market area, and vice versa. If two market areas are merged, and both are connected to a 
third market area, the merger of the two market areas creates a choice for network users for gas flows 
																																								 																				
1 The terms entry-exit system, entry-exit zone, and market area are used interchangeably. 
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between the merged market and the third market area. Since network users obtain a choice among 
routes, market mergers may imply competition among TSOs. 
In the literature, TSOs are generally considered as natural monopolies, which need to be 
regulated in absence of effective competition (Sherman 2001). In the U.S. gas industry, wellhead, 
production, interstate pipeline transmission, and local utility distribution are separated (Chermak 
1998; Makholm 2012). Market competition is among commodity suppliers to city gates, but not 
among infrastructure operators (Broadman 1986). Beukenkamp (2009) analyses pipeline competition 
in Europe, finding that some routes across Europe have the potential to compete. However, these are 
long-distance routes involving several countries and TSOs, whereas this paper focuses on adjacent 
markets. Von Hirschhausen et al. (2007) analysed competition among German TSOs and concluded 
that German TSOs are not exposed to effective competition and that there is no potential for such 
competition to arise. As several German TSOs asked to be granted an exemption from tariff 
regulation, the regulatory authority in charge also concluded that the companies were not exposed to 
effective existing or potential pipeline competition (Bundesnetzagentur 2008). However, the situation 
of Germany in 2007 and 2008, consisting of 16 market areas, indicated a significantly lower degree of 
market integration than today. The regulatory regime has also changed. For example, capacity 
products (defined by runtime) have been standardised, and are offered on a central booking platform.  
This paper examines the impact of gas market mergers and the potential for competition among 
regulated TSOs by analysing the efficiency of the network users' behaviour in terms of booking gas 
transmission capacity. We focus on the demand for gas transport capacities to and from the two 
German gas markets. As Germany has been faced with a strong reduction in the number of market 
areas via market mergers, inferences drawn from this experience may contribute to shaping the future 
of the European regulatory regime and market design. This paper analyses whether the choices made 
by network users are efficient. We define booking behaviour as being efficient if network users 
choose the transport alternative with the lowest tariff. We use auction data from the capacity booking 
platform PRISMA for the calendar year 2016 to determine the efficiency of network users’ booking 
behaviour. Our analysis looks at all capacity alternatives to and from the German gas markets, and 
compares the optimal costs of booking to the costs observed. The paper further provides explanations 
for inefficiencies.  
For both German gas markets, the results show a fairly efficient booking behaviour of network 
users. We conclude that network users make efficient use of the transport alternatives obtained from 
market mergers. However, we also find that differences between capacity types in the European and 
the national German regulation need to be considered. This explains to a very large extent why in 
some cases apparently more expensive alternatives are preferred over less expensive ones. Although 
gas transport capacity is highly standardised, the quality differences, i.e., the differences in capacity 
types, matter to network users.	As German TSOs distinguish a number of capacity types to deal with 
network constraints, market mergers have created transport alternatives for only 32% of cross-border 
capacity products. In almost all cases, we find that network users make efficient booking decisions. 
Following this introduction, the paper starts with a concise description of the background and 
functioning of European gas markets, and the effect of market mergers. Section 3 continues with 
economic theory, which leads to our hypothesis. Section 4 introduces the data used and Section 5 
explains our analysis. The results are reported in Section 6 and Section 7 provides our conclusions. 
Detailed results can be found in the Appendix.  
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2 Regulation and integration of European gas markets 
2.1 Entry-exit regulation 
 
EU Regulations and Directives determine the regulatory framework of European gas markets. 
Regulation (EC) No 715/2009, being part of the so-called Third Energy Package and also referred to 
as the Gas Regulation, prescribes a market design to be implemented by TSOs, referred to as the 
entry-exit system. The concept of entry-exit offers flexibility in gas transport, and allows for 
wholesale markets, so-called virtual trading points, in the market areas. In an entry-exit system, only 
two gas transport capacity contracts are necessary to supply a customer. A capacity contract at an 
entry point, e.g., a production facility, grants the right to inject gas into a TSO's network. 
Additionally, a contract for exit capacity is needed at the point where gas shall be withdrawn from the 
network, e.g., a customer (CEER 2011; Lohmann 2009). A network user only has to book and manage 
entry and exit capacity contracts to transport gas, and no specific physical transport routes in a 
network anymore, which reduces transaction costs (Vazquez et al. 2012).  With entry-exit systems, a 
network user also obtains increased flexibility as every entry point can supply every exit point. The 
management of the physical gas flows is solely the responsibility of TSOs. Hence, commercial 
trading, based on entry and exit, and physical gas transport are decoupled. Since TSO networks are 
well connected, gas may exit one market area and enter an adjacent one. Therefore, the entry-exit 
system allows for cross-border trade. 
As defined by the EU Gas Regulation, capacity offered by TSOs is either firm or interruptible, 
which refers to its quality (European Parliament and Council of the European Union 2009b). Firm 
capacity is without any risk to network users as it is contractually guaranteed as being non-
interruptible. To guarantee the flow, the amount of firm capacity on offer is limited by the physical 
capability of the network. In addition to firm capacity, TSO’s can offer interruptible capacity 
unlimitedly. However, this capacity may be interrupted by a TSO, for example, to ensure the security 
of supply in case the sum of intended gas flows would exceed the maximum flow possible. 
2.2 Market integration 
 
The introduction of entry-exit systems induced a major step towards completing the EU internal 
energy market for gas, but not a sufficient one (Frontier Economics Ltd., 2014). ACER and CEER 
(2015) conclude that for a number of markets even the full implementation of new market provisions, 
as foreseen by the third energy package,2 will not lead to a well-functioning internal gas market, and 
structural reforms related to market mergers, are necessary. 
Integrating markets can generally be referred to as abolishing barriers between single markets, 
such as tariffs (Belassa 1961). If (tariff) barriers are abolished completely, the single markets become 
one, and the law of one price applies (Li et al. 2014). The possibility for cross-border trade and, 
hence, also the degree of integration, is limited by the amount of interconnection capacity between the 
markets (Vazquez et al. 2012). As widely discussed in the literature, the European gas markets are 
already integrated to a large extent (Asche et al. 2013; Growitsch et al. 2013; Kuper and Mulder 2016; 
Petrovich 2013). However, further integration is considered necessary in order to obtain a well-
functioning internal gas market with higher liquidity, wholesale market competition, and supply price 
convergence.3 
																																								 																				
2 See the concept of network codes as stated in Article 6 of Regulation (EC) No 715/2009.  	
3 For further information on gas market integration and implementation tools, see ACER and CEER (2015). 
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2.3 Mergers in the German gas market 
 
Gas market mergers can be observed in Europe, particularly in Germany (Heather 2015; Lohmann 
2009). Compared to other EU Member States, which usually have one or two TSOs, Germany today 
has 16 TSOs offering gas transport capacity.4 In 2006, Germany consisted of 41 market areas, but due 
to market mergers, there are only two market areas left in Germany today, named “GASPOOL” and 
“Net Connect Germany (NCG)” (Monopolkommission 2009; Ströbele et al. 2012). As Germany has 
been faced a reduction in the number of market areas via market mergers, inferences drawn from this 
experience may contribute to shaping the future of the European regulatory regime and market design. 
The impact of several market mergers on connections to and from Germany is shown in Figure 1. 
The map shows the two market areas in Germany with GASPOOL mainly in the north, and NCG in 
the south of the country. In the west, there is also a mixed area, where pipelines of both market areas 
exist. The map further shows the number of different TSOs a network user can choose from for 
importing gas to (entry) and exporting gas from (exit) the German market areas. The arrows indicate 
the flow direction. The first number refers to the number of GASPOOL-TSOs, the second to the 
number of NCG-TSOs offering capacities a network user could choose from. As the figure shows, the 
capacity between the two markets is often offered by more than one TSO. Thus, market mergers have 
led to transport alternatives for network users at the border between some market areas. 
Fig. 1 
Map of German and adjacent market areas, and the number of German TSOs offering firm capacity 
products per flow direction.a Source: ENTSOG (2017b), FNB Gas e.V. (2018); own calculations 
 
a  The national markets of Belgium and Luxembourg have already merged. France has two national gas markets. 
However, NCG is only connected to the northern part of France (PEG Nord). 
																																								 																				
4 See https://platform.prisma-capacity.eu. 
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3 Theoretical framework 
3.1 Impact of market mergers on the choice of network users 
 
Consider three market areas, A, B, and C, that are geographically determined by the boundaries of the 
physical networks of TSO A, TSO B, and TSO C, respectively (see Figure 2). Each TSO’s network 
has a number of entry and exit points. If, for example, A4 is a production facility where gas is to be 
injected, and A2 is a customer where gas is to be withdrawn, then in this entry-exit system a supplier 
would need to book entry capacity at A4 and exit capacity at A2. If B3 is a customer in an adjacent 
market area also to be supplied by gas from A4, then a network user needs four capacity contracts: 
entry at A4, exit at A1 at the border, entry at B1 at the border, and finally exit at B3. This customer 
needs two more contracts because an entry-exit system allows only combining entry and exit points 
that belong to the same market area (Lohmann 2009; Vazquez et al. 2012).  
 
Fig. 2 
Example of unmerged market areas with entry-exit system 
 
Fig. 3 




Figure 3 illustrates that after the merger of the market areas A and B, the commercial border, i.e., 
A1/B1, between the two markets disappears. The supplier of the customer located at B3, which 
receives its gas from A4, needs only two capacity contracts after the merger instead of four, i.e., entry 
at A4 and exit at B3. Note that only the market areas merge while the TSOs A and B remain 
independent companies operating their network. The difference is that gas flows within an entry-exit 
system without any border restrictions. Merging the market areas A and B creates opportunities for 
network users’ gas flows between the merged market area A/B and the adjacent market area C; a 
network user can choose between TSO A and TSO B as illustrated by Figure 3. For example, a 
customer B3 is to be supplied by gas from the production facility C3. The respective supplier can 
choose gas to be transported either via C1/A6 or via C2/B6. The border points A6 and B6 are 
competing, and so are the TSOs A and B. Nevertheless, the merger has only an impact on the cross-
border capacity. For example, the capacity on offer to distribution system operators, storage facilities, 
and industrial customers being connected to the transmission system is not affected by the merger. 
Referring to the example, the capacity to exit B3 in order to supply the customer needs to be booked 
at TSO B, whether or not the merger has taken place.	
3.2 Network users’ booking behaviour 
 
Merging market areas requires network users to decide between different alternatives when booking 
gas transport capacity. Their decisions are supposed to be made in line with individual preferences 
based on utility and profit maximisation. If two (or more) capacity products differ in any of their 
characteristics, network users are supposed to choose the alternative in accordance with their 
preferences. Although capacity products are highly standardised by European regulation, a supplier 
still must choose between booking a yearly capacity contract and a profiled booking using multiple 
capacity products of shorter runtimes (European Commission 2017a). Additionally, capacity is either 
firm or interruptible. Interruptible capacity is associated with the risk of interruption as discussed in 
Section 2.1, which is why it is of a lower quality compared to firm capacity, and is offered at a 
discounted tariff reflecting the risk of interruption (European Commission 2017b). For this reason, a 
network user may have a preference to book capacity of lower quality if this is suitable for the 
underlying trade, and if the discount is subjectively perceived to outweigh the risk. Also, a network 
user may prefer to book a more expensive alternative at a certain TSO if, for example, both companies 
belong to the same corporate group. To avoid any kind of biased behaviour by vertically integrated 
companies, unbundling obligations were established (Bernaerts 2013; European Parliament and 
Council of the European Union 2009a). 
Besides costs for the capacity product, network users should consider any additional costs, such 
as those related to the booking procedure. For instance, a lack of transparency regarding available 
capacity may imply high costs of gathering additional information about the capacity products on 
offer, and how these can be booked. If more information about a specific capacity product is provided, 
the more expensive product may be preferred over a less expensive alternative. According to Kury 
(2015) increased transparency about the capacity on offer provided by an electricity TSO, can reduce 
information costs. 
Here we compare the actual capacity booking behaviour of network users and optimal booking 
behaviour. The latter is defined as behaviour that results in the lowest cost for booking with all other 
product characteristics being equal. Hence, the optimal booking behaviour results from cost-
minimisation. This allocative efficiency measure is, for instance, used in the analysis of the dispatch 
of power plants; given a variety of power plants using different technologies, an optimal dispatch 
needs to be determined to supply electricity to meet demand (Müsgens 2006).  
8	
	
The concept of a merit order analysis can also be used to measure the allocative efficiency of gas 
transport capacities. However, there are differences compared to power plants in the electricity sector. 
Gas transport capacities are booked via auctions on booking platforms. Alternatives of gas transport 
capacities are not offered in joint auctions, hence, unlike for electricity production capacity, there is 
no merit order created by the booking platform for gas transmission capacities. However, network 
users are able to compare the tariffs for standardised capacity products on offer and create merit 
orders themselves to decide which capacity to book. Another difference is that production capacity for 
electricity may be offered not only in one marketplace, but also in different marketplaces. Finally, in 
terms of prices, TSOs charge regulated tariffs, whereas power plants offer electricity at marginal costs 
(Morales and Pinedab 2017). 
Figure 4 gives an example of a merit order for gas transport capacity auctions. Since all the 
auctions are independent of each other, a network user is able to book capacity from each of the 
auctions. If, for example, capacity is booked in auction C, then the network user has to pay the 
amount of capacity booked times the tariff of that particular auction. If another network user books 
capacity in auction A, then the tariff of auction A applies. Since the auctions are independent of each 
other, there is no single market price. In this example, booking capacity in auction C is not efficient in 
case capacity has been available in other auctions at lower tariffs. However, if all networks users 
would try to book capacity in auction A, and the demand for capacity in this auction exceeds the 
amount on offer, surcharges will be included in the actual costs of booking. These auction surcharges 
may result in capacity allocation at a tariff that is higher than the tariff at which capacity was offered, 
for instance, in auction B. Hence, it would have been more efficient for a network user to directly 
book capacity at auction B. 
 
Fig. 4 
Example of a merit order for gas transport capacity products 
 
 
The comparison of the actual capacity allocation to the merit order determines the degree of 
allocative efficiency. Therefore, we can measure the allocative inefficiency by comparing the actual 
costs of booking observed with the optimal costs. The optimal costs are based on a merit order of all 
capacity products a network user could have chosen from. The actual costs observed refer to the 
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booked capacity amount and the price to be paid including auction surcharges when applied.5 Both the 
actual costs and the optimal costs are expressed as the average costs per unit.  
Given a European regulatory framework with effective unbundling rules, harmonised capacity 
products, the entry-exit system, and an equal level of transparency and transaction costs, the tariff of 
capacity is expected to be the driving force for deciding between transport alternatives. In absence of 
restrictions, it is economically efficient for network users to choose the least expensive alternative 
available. Therefore, we hypothesise that if network users have the choice between gas transport 
alternatives for one and the same market area, they book those capacities that are associated with the 
lowest total costs. 
4 Data  
 
Gas transport capacities are offered by TSOs and booked by network users. Capacities are offered on 
booking platforms, and allocated via auction procedures in line with European network access 
provision stated in the so-called network code on capacity allocation mechanisms (hereafter: NC 
CAM), to be applied since 1 November 2015 (European Commission 2017a). We use publicly 
available auction data from the leading European capacity booking platform for gas transport capacity 
named PRISMA (PRISMA European Capacity Platform GmbH 2016) for Germany for the calendar 
year 2016 to determine the efficiency of network users’ booking behaviour.6 Except for capacity to 
and from Poland, all auctions for primary capacity7 at German TSOs are auctioned via PRISMA. The 
auction results include, among others, entry and exit market area and network points, entry and exit 
TSO, capacity on offer and allocated, as well as all tariffs and additional fees that are charged to 
network users. The introduction of NC CAM implied a huge change to the regulatory framework, and 
the allocation procedure. Furthermore, before NC CAM, not all TSOs offered capacity via PRISMA. 
To ensure data consistency, the data set used in the analysis covers the calendar year 2016 in which no 
major regulatory changes, in particular to capacity allocation and network tariffs, were applied. 
The data extracted from PRISMA for the calendar year 2016 delivers 2,089,914 single 
observations of auctions. However, data cleansing is necessary (see Table 1). For reasons discussed 
earlier, we focus on German markets; auctions not involving German markets were eliminated. 
 
																																								 																				
5 By comparison, in electricity markets, the inefficiency is calculated on the basis of the market price (i.e., the actual system 
marginal costs) and the system marginal costs in case of optimal dispatch.  
6 The data are available on the PRISMA website: https://platform.prisma-capacity.eu/#/reporting/standard. At the point in 
time, the analysis was conducted, the available data only covered the calendar year 2016. Since then, no further mergers took 
place in Germany, nor has the regulatory framework changed significantly. Thus, we are confident that analysing 2016 data 
allows for general conclusions.	
7 According to the Gas Regulation, primary capacity refers to capacity that is directly booked at the TSO. As compared to 




Summary of PRISMA auction data for 2016, and data cleansing. Source: PRISMA European Capacity 
Platform GmbH (2016); own calculations 
 Number of auctions 
PRISMA auction data (1 Jan. 2016 – 1 Jan. 2017) 2,089,914 
- auctions not involving German markets 1,087,388 
- auctions where capacity is not bundled and not firm  472,753 
+ auctions where capacity is unbundled firm  
 and to or from non-EU country 
116,138 
- cancelled auctions 182 
Remaining 645,729 
of which auctions to or from EU countries 529,618 
of which auctions to or from non-EU countries 116,111 
 
As outlined in Section 2.1, capacity may be either firm or interruptible. NC CAM prescribes TSO 
to offer firm capacity as bundled capacity. Bundling refers a package of corresponding firm entry and 
exit capacity that is auctioned. Interruptible capacity is not offered bundled. Firm capacity may be 
offered unbundled, though. However, this is limited to the case where available capacity on one side 
of the border exceeds the available firm capacity on the other side. Network users who already hold 
corresponding capacity at the other side, e.g., due to an existing long-term contract, may book 
unbundled firm capacity. Also, network users who are willing to combine one firm capacity product 
with interruptible capacity may be interested in unbundled firm capacity. However, network users 
assess their demand for interruptible capacity differently. Although relevant data are publicly 
available, the assessment, for example of the probability of interruption, and the resulting 
consequences, differ per network user. The risk preference differs as well. As a consequence, only 
firm and bundled capacity is considered for the analysis. Data on unbundled and interruptible 
capacities are omitted to avoid a distortion of the results. Finally, a small number of auctions is 
cancelled, so there are 645,618 observations remaining, of which 82% involves connection to and 
from EU countries. 
The NC CAM only applies to TSOs within the EU. However, TSOs in the EU may have 
connections to non-EU countries. German TSOs offer capacity to non-EU countries also via PRISMA 
in line with the same provisions that apply for connection to other EU Member States. However firm 
capacity to and from non-EU countries is marketed only unbundled. Since the analysis can identify 
these auction data, they are not omitted but taken into account with special caution. 
NC CAM harmonises capacity products. A capacity product is defined by its runtime, which may 
be a year, a quarter, a month, a day, or a number of hours of a day. Table 2 shows the number of 




Number of PRISMA auctions, offered capacity, and booked capacity per capacity product of German 











Within-day 617,100 899,590 1,150 0.13 
Day-ahead 27,426 40,820 617 1.51 
Month 590 1,094 35 3.23 
Quarter 214 392 4 1.05 
Year 399 884 14 1.63 
 
In general, the longer the runtime, the fewer auctions take place. This seems obvious as, for 
example, within the runtime of a yearly capacity product, 365 (366) day-ahead auctions take place. 
Table 2 compares the amount of capacity offered and booked. The booking rate indicates that the 
demand for capacity is fairly low. However, the data cover all auctions with German TSOs in 2016. A 
network user may hold a long-term contract concluded in the past, which is still valid. Hence, such a 
network user has no, or at least a lower demand, for new capacity. However, the capacity products are 
dependent on each other. For example, capacity that was offered but not booked in the auction for 
yearly capacity will be offered again as a quarterly product. The amount left unallocated will be 
reoffered as a monthly product, day-ahead and maybe within-day product. Hence, one unit of 
capacity, which is not booked, will be counted several times.  
Tables 3 and 4 give an overview of the number of auctions held in 2016 for each gas transport 
connection to and from Germany. For each flow direction, more auctions involve the NCG market 
area compared to GASPOOL (approx. 63% entry, 59% exit). The number of auctions held in 2016 
varies among the different connections for both entry and exit. Entry from the Dutch TTF shows by 
far the largest number of auctions.  
 
Table 3 
Number of PRISMA auctions for entry capacity to the German market areas in 2016. Source: 
PRISMA European Capacity Platform GmbH (2016); own calculations 
Exit       \       Entry GASPOOL NCG Sum 
internal borders 
GASPOOL - 73,194 73,194 
NCG 56,940 - 56,940 
external borders 
Austria - 20,712 20,712 
Belgium / Luxembourg 8,679 25,799 34,478 
Czech Republic 8,787 36,293 45,080 
Denmark 8,711 8,457 17,168 
The Netherlands 31,698 77,130 108,828 
Norway 22,195 24,377 46,572 
Russia 18,236 - 18,236 




Number of PRISMA auctions for exit capacity from the German market areas in 2016. Source: 
PRISMA European Capacity Platform GmbH (2016); own calculations 
Entry       \       Exit GASPOOL NCG Sum 
internal borders 
GASPOOL - 56,940 56,940 
NCG 73,194 - 73,194 
external borders 
Austria - 3,842 3,842 
Belgium / Luxembourg 8,519 17,610 26,129 
Czech Republic 19,553 13,123 32,676 
Denmark 12,159 - 12,159 
France - 19,690 19,690 
The Netherlands 21,915 56,807 78,722 
Switzerland - 26,311 26,311 
Norway 8,754 16,238 24,992 
Sum 144,094 210,561 354,655 
5 Methodology 
5.1 Constructing homogeneous groups of auctions 
 
Using the data described, we test the hypothesis formulated in Section 3.2 regarding the booking 
behaviour of network users. Since the dataset contains auctions that are single observations, we need 
to group these observations in such a way that any group of observations represents an exhaustive list 
of all alternatives from which a network user, with a specific need for gas transport capacity, could 
choose. This will be called a homogeneous group of auctions. For every homogeneous group of 
auctions, we determine the efficiency of the network users’ booking behaviour.  
The following attributes are considered to guarantee that all auctions have equal characteristics, 
and thus are alternatives for network users: 
• Market area entry/exit: 
To be an alternative for network users, capacity needs to connect the same two market areas. 
Since capacity is a means to fulfil a commodity trade, the commodity trade prescribes the 
capacity needed. Every auction offering capacity that allows for the trade to be physically 
fulfilled needs to connect the same market area in the entry as well as in the exit direction. 
Treating entry and exit as two different attributes ensures that all auctions of a homogeneous 
group of auctions have the same flow direction, which is a necessary condition. 
• Capacity product (runtime): 
A network user may place a bid in an auction offering, for example, a monthly capacity 
product. However, he may also book day-ahead capacity on every day of the month. By 
placing a bid in an auction for monthly capacity, the network user reveals a preference for the 
monthly product over a month of day-ahead products. Hence, other capacity products may be 
an alternative but are not preferred, or were not auctioned at the time the network users 
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wanted to obtain capacity. Thus, only capacities with the same runtime are considered 
alternatives.  
• Start of auction: 
A capacity product may not be auctioned at the same time as the capacity of another runtime. 
The timing of capacity auctioning follows the so-called auction calendar (ENTSOG 2017a; 
European Commission 2017a). If a network user wants to book capacity at a certain point in 
time, he can only choose from those auctions that are open at that point in time. In accordance 
with the auction calendar and the auction algorithms applied, the start of an auction is 
harmonised. Only if the start of auctions is equal, the auctions can be alternatives. 
• Runtime start: 
The capacity product and the start of the auction are not sufficient to cover the time 
dimension. According to the auction calendar, there are two different within-day auctions 
taking place at 7:00 p.m. each day: First, within-day capacity is offered for the next gas day.8 
It has the same runtime as a day-ahead product, i.e., one gas day of 24 hours. As within-day 
capacity is sold after day-ahead capacity, the amount offered is the non-allocated amount of 
firm day-ahead capacity. The runtime of this capacity starts at the next gas day. Second, 
within-day capacity for the rest of the current gas day is also auctioned at 7:00 p.m. The 
runtime of this capacity starts four hours after the start of the respective auctions, and ends at 
the end of the same gas day (European Commission 2017a). This underlines that within-day 
capacity is, in fact, a “rest-of-the-day” capacity. Since these two within-day auctions are not 
alternatives, the runtime start of the capacity products on offer is needed to define 
homogeneous groups of auctions. 	
• Gas quality: 
The chemical composition of gas may vary within a certain range. A capacity product in 
Germany may be either high calorific gas (H-gas) capacity or low calorific gas (L-gas) 
capacity. H- and L-gas capacity are not substitutes and, hence, they are no alternatives for 
network users. 
 
If auctions have equal characteristics defined by these attributes, they belong to the same 
homogeneous group of auctions and can be considered as alternatives for network users. According to 
this definition, a homogeneous group can contain auctions of several TSOs. As stated in Section 2, 
this is the result of market mergers that have taken place, and a reason why network users have a 
choice between alternatives in gas transport. It is a necessary condition to allow for infrastructure 
competition. To determine the efficiency of the homogeneous groups, two conditions must apply: 
(1) The efficiency of booking behaviour may only be assessed if network users have a choice. In 
case a homogeneous group of auctions consists of only one auction, networks users do not 
have a choice between alternatives. Thus, as a condition, a homogeneous group needs to 
contain multiple auctions. 
(2) Since we intend to measure allocative efficiency, capacity needs to be allocated. Therefore, as 
a second condition, the sum of capacity allocated in all the auctions of that group must be 
greater than zero. 
 
																																								 																				
8 A gas day is defined as the period of 24 hours starting at 5.00 UTC in wintertime and starting at 4.00 UTC in daylight 
saving time (European Commission 2017a). Hence, in central Europe, a gas day is from 6.00 a.m. till 6.00 a.m. the next day. 
If not stated differently, the time refers to Central European (Summer) Time, CE(S)T. 
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Only those homogeneous groups of auctions fulfilling these conditions are considered in determining 
the efficiency of the network users’ booking behaviour.   
5.2 Inefficiency measure 
 
In order to test the hypothesis, the efficiency of every homogeneous group of auctions is determined. 
For this purpose, we calculate for each homogeneous group an indicator IER that compares the actual 
costs of booking observed with the optimal costs of booking (see Equation 1). Hence, IER will have a 
minimum value of 1.00, in which case efficiency is 100%. 
 
IER = 
actual costs of booking
optimal costs of booking
 (1) 
 
IER is calculated for each homogeneous group of auctions. To interpret and compare the results, 
a weighted IER for a cluster of homogeneous groups can be used. Such a cluster may consist of, for 
example, all homogeneous groups connecting two specific market areas, and its IER may be 
compared with those of another connection. The weighted IER calculates a weighted average of all 
the individual IERs of the relevant homogeneous groups. As a weight, we use the runtime of the 
capacity product normalised to days, as well as the capacity allocated in kWh/h/runtime of each 
homogeneous group (indexed i) as expressed by Equation (2). 
IER weighted= 
 (IERi × runtimei × allocated capacityi)
n
i=1





First, we determine the actual cost of booking, i.e., what network users actually had to pay to 
TSOs for the capacity allocated. In order to do so, we calculate for every auction what a network user 
had to pay for a single unit of capacity. These costs are based on regulated network tariffs, which are 
the starting prices for the capacity auctions. In the case of contractual congestions, in which the 
demand for capacity exceeds the quantity on offer, an auction surcharge is added, which is determined 
automatically during the auctioning process with the aim of finding an equilibrium. Thus, the auction 
surcharge represents the price for scarcity.9 Furthermore, additional charges or fees are considered if 
applied by the respective TSO. These may be charged, for example, for metering services, billing 
services, or gas quality conversion. All this information is contained in the PRISMA data used (see 
Section 4). As the costs may be charged in different units, all these components are harmonised to 
cent/kWh/h/runtime. In case charges are not provided in Euros, daily exchange rates of the European 
Central Bank are used to convert to Euros. The actual costs of booking are then determined for every 
homogeneous group of auctions. This is done by multiplying for every auction the costs of a single 
unit of capacity by the amount of capacity allocated and aggregating them per each homogenous 
group. 
In order to calculate the optimal costs per homogenous group of auctions, we create a merit order 
for every homogeneous group by ranking all auctions in ascending order of the costs per unit of 
																																								 																				
9 See Article 16 to 18 of NC CAM for further details on the auction algorithms and auction surcharge, the so-called price 
steps. These price steps are predefined for the auctions, are transparent during the auction, and contained in the data set used, 
as it is an integral part of the auction results. 
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capacity (see Section 3.2). The optimal costs of booking are then determined for every homogeneous 
group of auctions by multiplying the total capacity allocation of each homogeneous group with the 
costs according to the respective merit order. After having calculated the actual costs as well as the 
optimal cost, an IER is calculated for every homogeneous group of auctions using Equation (1). 
Applying Equation (2) yields weighted IER for different clusters of homogenous groups of auctions. 
6 Results 
6.1 Efficiency of booking 
 
The conditions of a mandatory capacity allocation and the minimum size appear to have a large 
impact on the number of homogenous groups of auctions. As reported in Table 5, 645,729 
observations are allocated to 262,881 groups following the definition of homogeneous groups. 
Approximately 36% (93,546) of all homogeneous groups need to be omitted as they consist of only a 
single auction, and hence do not offer a choice to network users. The second condition has an even 
larger impact. Only 1.5% of all groups contain at least one auction where at least one unit of capacity 
was allocated. This means that in the vast majority of all auctions, capacity was offered but not 
booked (see also Table 2). After applying the two conditions only 3,003 out of 262,881 homogeneous 
groups remain. 
Table 6 shows the impact of the conditions applied to homogenous groups of auctions per 
capacity product. Less than one percent of all within-day auction and groups of within-day auctions 
meet the conditions. However, for within-day capacity, auctions, as well as homogeneous groups, 
amounts to approximately 96% of all data in the data set. The size of homogeneous groups varies 
between one and eight auctions, as shown by Table 7. The number of auctions is obtained by 
multiplying the size of groups with the number of homogeneous groups. Omitting groups consisting 
of one auction, and applying the condition of a successful capacity allocation, about 30% of all 
remaining homogeneous groups contain two auctions, and about 55% contain three auctions. 
To analyse the efficiency of network users’ booking behaviour, we cluster the individual 
inefficiency ratios, and apply the weighted IER according to Equation (2) using the runtimes and 
capacity allocated as the weights. Table 8 summarises the results of the efficiency calculation and 
shows that GASPOOL capacity (weighted IER: 1.17) is booked less efficiently compared to NCG 
capacity (weighted IER: 1.05). However, about three-quarters of the loss in monetary terms is 
associated with NCG capacity. Although there may be restrictions regarding booking capacity to and 
from non-EU countries, those capacities are booked more efficiently (weighted IER: 1.05) compared 
to connections to and from EU countries (weighted IER: 1.07). The overall inefficiency is about 6%, 
which amounts to about four million Euros. 
 Tables 10 to 15 in the Appendix show detailed results for different clusters of connections. 
According to these, about 81% of all inefficiencies in monetary terms for GASPOOL connections 
result from an inefficient booking behaviour of entry capacity from Norway (20%) and Russia (61%). 
The respective weighted IERs are 1.09 and 2.10. GASPOOL entry from NCG shows a relatively high 
weighted IER of 1.16, whereas the inefficiency in monetary terms is relatively low with about 5 
thousand Euros. In terms of NCG connections, in particular, import capacity for L-gas from The 
Netherlands (58%), from Norway (12%), and export capacity to Austria (21%) reveal the highest 
inefficiencies in monetary terms. The respective weighted IERs are 1.04, 1.02, and 1.51. These 
highlight that a high monetary share of inefficiency and a high or low IER may, but not necessarily 
have to, correlate. The reason is that the number of auctions associated with a certain cluster of 
connections influences the inefficiency in monetary terms. A specific inefficiency may be obtained by 
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a few auctions with high inefficiency but also by a high number of auctions with low inefficiencies. 
Hence, the weighted IER shows where efficiency gains are possible, whereas the inefficiency in 
monetary terms shows the impact of potential efficiency gains. 
 
Table 5 
Number of homogeneous groups of auctionsa based on PRISMA auction data for Germany TSOs in 
2016 under conditions. Source: PRISMA European Capacity Platform GmbH (2016); own 
calculations  
Number of auctions and  
homogeneous groups 
Single auctions after data cleansing 645,729 
Homogeneous groups of auctions 262,881 
     of which containing one auction 93,546 
     of which containing multiple auctions 169,335 
     of which no capacity allocated 258,957 
     of which capacity allocated 3,924 
     of which unconditional 259,878 
     of which conditional  3,003 
a  The number of conditional homogeneous groups of auctions refers to those that contain multiple auctions as 
well as allocated capacity as stated in Section 5.1. Unconditional refers to those auctions and homogenous 
groups on which the two conditions are not imposed. 
 
Table 6 
Number of homogeneous groups of auctionsa based on PRISMA auction data for Germany TSOs in 
2016 under conditions per capacity product. Source: PRISMA European Capacity Platform GmbH 
















Within-day 617,100 251,293 5,260 1,528 0.85 0.61 
Day-ahead 27,426 10,955 4,014 1,374 5.01 12.54 
Month 590 287 216 70 36.61 24.39 
Quarter 214 100 32 14 14.95 14.00 
Year 399 246 47 17 11.78 6.91 
Sum 645,729 262,881 6,929 3,003 1.07 1.14 
a  The number of conditional homogeneous groups of auctions refers to those that contain multiple auctions as 
well as allocated capacity as stated in Section 5.1. Unconditional refers to those auctions and homogenous 




Number and size of homogeneous groups of auctions based on PRISMA auction data of Germany 
TSOs in 2016, and allocation of capacity. Source: PRISMA European Capacity Platform GmbH 
(2016); own calculations 
Number of auctions 
per homogeneous 
group 
Number of homogeneous  
groups 
of which 




1 93,546 92,625 921 
2 68,272 67,374 898 
3 56,367 54,790 1,577 
4 13,268 13,228 40 
5 7,963 7,797 166 
6 11,591 11,381 210 
7 10,887 10,783 104 
8 987 979 8 
Sum 262,881 258,957 3,924 
 
Table 8  
Inefficiency based on PRISMA auction data of German TSOs in 2016. Source: PRISMA European 
Capacity Platform GmbH (2016); own calculations 






GASPOOL entry 1.22  731 
GASPOOL exit 1.02  48 
Total GASPOOL 1.17  780  
NCG entry 1.03  2,389  
NCG exit 1.31  894  
Total NCG 1.05  3,283  
EU  1.07  3,002   
Non-EU  1.05  1,028 
Overall 1.06  4,030   
 
6.2 Explaining observed inefficiencies by national regulation 
 
As elaborated in Section 4, the analysis takes into account only firm capacity. With reference to the 
European regulatory framework, it has been assumed that gas transport capacity offered by the TSOs 
is harmonised such that the quality of capacity is always either firm or interruptible. Besides the 
European regulation, however, there is also national regulation. German firm capacity, which is 
analysed here, also includes conditional firm capacities foreseen by national regulation and introduced 
by German TSO.  
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Markets mergers also affect the quality of capacity products offered by a TSO. Within an entry-
exit system, every entry point may be used to supply every exit point, which also holds if an entry-exit 
system consists of more than one TSO. However, this flexibility is limited by the capacity connecting 
TSO networks. If the intended gas flows of network users induce a flow between two networks of the 
same market area that exceeds the technical capacity, no transport is possible. However, if the 
capacity used to transport the gas is firm capacity, the TSOs do not have the right to interrupt the gas 
flow, although this would be necessary. Whilst market mergers resolve barriers to commodity trading, 
market mergers can impose restrictions in terms of firmness and free allocability of capacity. To face 
these restrictions, the total capacity amount on offer may be reduced, investments in network 
expansions may be undertaken, or the restrictions are reflected in the quality of the capacity offered 
(Wagner & Elbling GmbH 2014). German TSOs chose the latter option and introduced additional 
capacity types reflecting the restrictions implied by the merger taken place. All of them are treated as 
firm capacity although they are firm only conditionally. These conditions may be linked, for example, 
to fluctuations in demand or specific point-to-point connections (Kooperationsvereinbarung Gas 
(Annex 1) 2016). Hence, compared to European regulation, there are multiple firm capacity types in 
Germany. These conditions imply a risk, which is reflected in the networks tariffs by granting a 
discount (Bundesnetzagentur 2015).  
Multiple firm capacity types offered by German TSO may have an impact on the network users' 
booking behaviour. Although there might be a less expensive conditional firm capacity on offer, the 
capacity may not be suitable for a network user. This may be either because of the conditions or 
because of the discount that may not adequately reflect the risk as assessed by the network user. As an 
explanation of the inefficiencies measured initially, we hypothesise that capacity type has an impact 
on booking behaviour. For example, capacity that is always firm and capacity that is firm only in 
accordance with a certain demand reflect different quality, and therefore are not complete substitutes. 
Hence, a network user who might be completely risk averse may never book conditional firm capacity 
even in case it is offered at a lower tariff compared to non-conditional firm capacity.  If the capacity 
type matters, then the analysis needs to control not only for firm and interruptible capacity but also for 
different firm capacity types. Thus, the definition of homogeneous groups will be extended by the 
type of firm capacity for both entry and exit capacity of a firm bundled capacity product. 
A stricter definition of a homogeneous group increases the number of groups, because auctions 
must share common characteristics in order to belong to the same group. Table 9 compares the 
number of homogeneous groups for the two different definitions of firm capacity. The stricter 
definition leads to an increase from 262,881 to 448,822 groups. However, the number of groups with 
at least two single auctions decreases by approximately 16%. The condition that capacity must be 
allocated in at least one auction of a group is also very restrictive. The number of groups meeting this 
condition rises by about 19%, which is less than the increase in all homogeneous groups (+71%). 
Applying the German definition of firm capacity, the number of groups meeting both conditions 
declines by about 42% as compared to applying the weaker definition of a homogenous group.  
Taking account of differences in capacity types, approximately 68% of all homogenous groups 
contain only one auction, and hence, do not offer alternatives of transport capacity to network users. 
However, about 32% of all homogenous groups offer alternatives as they consist of at least two 
auctions with equal characteristics. If there was a higher harmonisation of capacity types leading to a 





Comparison of the number of homogeneous groups of auctionsa based on PRISMA auction data of 
Germany TSOs in 2016 under conditions and according to the EU and German definition of firm 
capacity. Source: PRISMA European Capacity Platform GmbH (2016); own calculations 
 
Number of auctions and homogeneous groups 
according to EU firm  
capacity 
according to German firm 
capacity 
Single auctions after data cleansing 645,729 645,729 
Homogeneous groups of auctions 262,881 448,822 
     of which containing one auction 93,546 305,764 
     of which containing multiple auctions 169,335 143,058 
     of which no capacity was allocated 258,957 444,162 
     of which capacity was allocated 3,924 4,660 
     of which unconditional 259,878 447,095 
     of which conditional 3,003 1,727 
a  The number of conditional homogeneous groups of auctions refers to those that contain multiple auctions as 
well as allocated capacity as stated in Section 5.1. Unconditional refers to those auctions and homogenous 
groups on which the two conditions are not imposed. 
 
Figure 5 summarises the results of the adjusted efficiency calculation considering the German 
definition of firm capacity and compares it to the initial calculation using the EU definition of firm 
capacity. Initially, the weighted IER for GASPOOL entry and NCG exit show relatively high 
inefficiencies. Taking into account the different firm capacity types that exist in Germany results in a 
large decrease of these inefficiencies. Overall, GASPOOL has a weighted IER of 1.05 and NCG even 
of 1.00 compared to 1.17 and 1.05 initially calculated applying the EU definition of firm capacity. EU 
connections are at 1.01, falling from 1.07. Even though there may be additional restrictions 
influencing the booking behaviour at the border with non-EU countries, also these connections show a 
weighted IER of 1.01. Overall, the inefficiency measured is at about 1%. In monetary terms, 
approximately 93% of all inefficiencies can be explained by controlling for different firm capacity 
types as used in Germany. However, the reduction of the inefficiency in monetary terms explained by 
the different definition of firm capacity for GASPOOL exit is, compared to the other clusters of 
connections, relatively low (about 11.6%). Looking at the absolute numbers reveal that the 
inefficiency initially determined has already been relatively low for GASPOOL exit, and therefore, 
applying the different definition of firm capacity to explain inefficiencies only has a relatively small 
impact.  
Tables 16 to 21 in the Appendix show detailed results for different clusters of connections. For 
GASPOOL connections, entry capacity from Norway shows the highest inefficiency (weighted IER: 
1.09) accounting for about 78% of all the inefficiency measured for GASPOOL connections, which 
amounts to about 156 thousand Euros. For NCG connections, import from Norway has become full 
efficient with a weighted IER of 1.00 and no inefficiency in monetary terms. L-gas import capacity 
from The Netherlands to NCG also reveals a weighted IER of 1.00 but suggests an inefficiency of 
about 19 thousand Euros due to a relatively high number of auctions. This again shows that even 
small inefficiencies can lead to a certain amount in case the number of auctions is relatively high. Exit 
capacity from NCG to Austria is still relatively inefficient (weighted IER: 1.13) but the monetary 
impact is fairly low as the number of auctions is low as well. Exit capacity for H-gas from NCG to 
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The Netherlands, however, is booked relatively inefficiently (weighted IER: 1.21) causing an 




Inefficiency explained by taking account of the German definition of firm capacity based on PRISMA 





European regulators aim at the higher integration of gas markets (ACER and CEER 2015). Merging 
gas markets could lead to competition among transmission system operators within the merged 
markets for cross-border transmission capacity. Assuming inter-TSO competition, it is expected that 
there are no constraints that prevent network users from making efficient choices, i.e., that they 
choose those network connections with the lowest network tariffs.  
Analysing the booking behaviour of network users in the German gas markets in 2016, we find 
an inefficiency of approximately 6% when we only include one type of firm capacity as defined by 
European regulation. Most of the inefficiency can be explained by taking into account different types 
of firm capacity, which in Germany deal with network constraints. We find that market mergers have 
created transport alternatives for 32% of all cross-border capacity products, which are booked with an 
inefficiency of about 1%. Thus, we conclude that network users are sensitive to differences in gas 
transport capacity offered by TSOs, and that their booking behaviour is largely efficient. Our analysis 
underlines that network users making their booking decisions are not only sensitive to differences in 
network tariffs, but that differences in terms of the quality of capacity products also matter. 
Our analysis differs from previous studies on market integration (e.g., Asche et al. 2013; Kuper 
and Mulder 2016; Petrovich 2013), as it does not focus on the degree of wholesale market integration 
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but on the impact of gas market mergers on the competition among infrastructure operators. As we 
find that network users make efficient use of the booking alternatives that are created by merging 
markets, we conclude there are no constraints for network users to book the least expensive capacity 
on offer.  
Our results reveal the possibility that market mergers have the potential to create infrastructure 
competition among TSOs for gas transport capacity. Such competition would be limited to specific 
cross-border capacity where capacity products have the same characteristics. In this respect, we find 
that taking into account the quality of capacity (the capacity type) is important. Further harmonisation 
of capacity types has the potential to increase the number of alternative capacity products at the 
border of merged gas markets. Since there is also capacity that is not affected by a market merger, a 
TSO regulation would still be necessary even if inter-TSO competition may be found for capacity at 
the border of merged gas markets. Nevertheless, changes to the regulatory framework may be 
economically reasonable to allow for the coexistence of regulation and competition. However, the 
question of whether or not inter-TSO competition for certain cross-border capacity exists cannot be 
answered conclusively from the results of our analysis. Such competition not only depends on the 
network users’ behaviour but also on the behaviour of the TSOs. In this paper, we did not analyse 
how TSOs set the tariffs for access to their networks. TSOs set the tariffs based on the regulatory 
framework they are operating in. Therefore, before any conclusion about competition among TSOs 
within merged market areas can be drawn, it is necessary to investigate the TSOs behaviour, taking 
into account the constraints given by the regulatory framework. 
 The results of this analysis may be relevant to the debate over the European regulatory 
framework, which includes the means of harmonisation within the EU (European Parliament and 
Council of the European Union 2009b). One concept of harmonisation, for example, is the provision 
of so-called virtual interconnection points, which require TSOs to combine their network points that 
connect the same entry-exit systems into one virtual point for the sake of joint capacity marketing 
(European Commission 2017a). Our paper reveals that network users are able to choose among 
different capacity alternatives, and are making efficient booking decisions. Hence, restricting 
transport alternatives by introducing virtual interconnection points is not needed as a means to 
increase efficiency, at least not in the German gas market.  
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Appendix: Detailed results of inefficiency determination 
Tables 10 to 15 show detailed results of the analysis for different clusters of connections: Tables 10 to 13 deal with connections to and from the German market areas; Table 10 (entry) and 
Table 11 (exit) with GASPOOL, Table 12 (entry) and Table 13 (exit) with NCG. The results are also shown separately for the borders of the German market areas with EU Member States 
(Table 14) and with non-EU countries (Table 15). In terms of the inefficiency ratio IER, the tables report the minimum, maximum, average (x), standard deviation (σ) and coefficient of 
variation (σ/!), and a capacity and runtime weighted average for each cluster of connection. All the calculations are based on auction data from PRISMA European Capacity Platform GmbH 
(2016). IER and costs are calculated as stated in Section 5.2. The number of conditional homogeneous groups and contained auctions refer to those groups that contain multiple auctions and 
allocated capacity as stated in Section 5.1. Unconditional refers to those auctions and homogenous groups on which the two conditions are not imposed.  
Table 10 
Inefficiency results for entry connections to GASPOOL based on PRISMA auction data for 2016 
Exit Gas  
quality 



















NCG H  9,079   54,086   88   493  1.00 1.63 1.38 0.22 0,16 1.16  42,330  -  37,455   4,875  
Norway H  8,855   22,195   177   473  1.00 1.10 1.05 0.05 0.05 1.09 2,090,395  - 1,934,782   155,612  
Russia H  9,057   18,236   3   6  1.00 2.65 2.10 0.78 0.37 2.10  799,579  -  325,040   474,539  
The 
Netherlands 
L  9,016   22,895   368   1,025  1.00 1.92 1.07 0.16 0.15 1.02 3,409,200   10,843  3,323,662   96,381  
Sum  36,007   117,412   636   1,997       1.22 6,341,504   10,843  5,620,939   731,407  
 
Table 11 


























H  8,459   19,553   26   70  1.00 1.55 1.11 0.19 0.17 1.02  870,378  -  853,588   16,790  
Denmark H  8,642   12,159   65   130  1.00 1.03 1.00 0.01 0.01 1.00  10,548  -  10,507   41  
NCG H  9,082   56,724   117   723  1.00 1.61 1.06 0.15 0.14 1.01 1,418,425  - 1,397,795   20,630  
The 
Netherlands 
H  8,790   14,477   40   80  1.00 1.48 1.06 0.13 0.12 1.04  93,478  -  90,156   3,322  
NCG L  8,736   16,470   231   462  1.00 1.22 1.21 0.05 0.04 1.05  150,177  -  142,825   7,352  




























Republic H  8,945   36,293   2   7  1.08 1.10 1.09 0.01 0.01 1.09  49  -  44   4  
GASPOOL H  9,082   56,724   117   723  1.00 1.61 1.06 0.15 0.14 1.01  1,418,425  -  1,397,795   20,630  
Austria H  5,479   20,712   10   35  1.38 2.01 1.60 0.23 0.14 1.49  6,449  -  4,372   2,077  
Norway H  8,985   24,377   201   581  1.00 1.31 1.16 0.08 0.07 1.02 21,785,433  - 21,387,847   397,586  
The 
Netherlands H  9,084   52,550   139   753  1.00 1.92 1.09 0.13 0.12 1.06  1,196,677   17,029   1,143,066   70,640  
Belgium / 
Luxembourg 
H  8,915   25,799   10   23  1.00 1.18 1.03 0.06 0.06 1.01  2,194   22   2,193   22  
GASPOOL L  8,736   16,470   231   462  1.00 1.22 1.21 0.05 0.04 1.05  150,177  -  142,825   7,352  
The 
Netherlands L  8,856   24,580   949   2,720  1.00 1.21 1.04 0.06 0.06 1.04 52,360,236   96,325  50,565,743   1,890,818  
Sum  68,082   257,505   1,659   5,304       1.03 76,919,640   113,376  74,643,885   2,389,129  
 
Table 13 






















Switzerland H  9,019   26,311   35   87  1.00 1.00 1.00 - - 1.00 1,149,916  - 1,149,916  - 
Czech  
Republic 
H  8,433   13,123   3   6  1.04 1.08 1.06 0.02 0.02 1.06  8,663  -  8,247   416  
GASPOOL H  9,079   54,086   88   493  1.00 1.63 1.38 0.22 0.16 1.16  42,330  -  37,455   4,875  
France H  6,855   19,690   55   153  1.00 1.16 1.03 0.03 0.03 1.04  631,453  -  611,244   20,209  
Austria H  2,990   3,842   196   402  1.00 10.05 3.01 2.24 0.74 1.51 2,356,379   284,590  1,961,632   679,338  
The 
Netherlands 
H  9,000   39,510   230   1,191  1.00 11.77 1.13 0.72 0.64 1.18 1,016,633   153,009   983,087   186,555  
Belgium / 
Luxembourg 
H  8,904   17,610   7   14  1.00 1.00 1.00 - - 1.00 62,216 35 62,121 130 
The  
Netherlands L  8,183   17,297   51   135  1.00 1.21 1.03 0.07 0.07 1.02 176,781 16 174,162 2,635 



























Within-day H 157,261   418,522   473   2,314  1.00 11.77 1.11 0.52 0.47 1.13  2,649,957  164,698   2,541,032   273,623  
Within-day L  43,104   87,401   894   2,499  1.00 1.92 1.05 0.11 0.10 1.03 15,944,187   101,351  15,542,562   502,977  
Day-ahead H  6,883   18,671   469   1,606  1.00 10.05 1.92 1.72 0.90 1.98  1,776,639   289,987   1,359,291   707,334  
Day-ahead L  1,904   3,984   682   1,787  1.00 1.75 1.09 0.10 0.09 1.06  5,540,668   5,832   5,279,987   266,513  
Month H 204   420   34   127  1.00 1.61 1.23 0.22 0.18 1.01  1,696,906  -  1,678,617   18,289  
Month L  35   75   19   47  1.00 1.11 1.03 0.04 0.04 1.04 10,480,214  - 10,105,814   374,400  
Quarter H  72   156   5   12  1.00 1.00 1.00 - - 1.00  1,300,800  -  1,300,800  - 
Quarter L  12   28   1   2  1.58 1.58 1.58 - - 1.58  23,316  -  14,735   8,580  
Year H  193   315   7   21  1.00 1.58 1.18 0.21 0.18 1.02  291,569  -  285,767   5,802  
Year L  28   46   3   7  1.00 1.11 1.05 0.05 0.05 1.04 24,108,008  - 23,263,293   844,716  
Sum  209,696   529,618   2,587   8,422       1.07 63,812,264   561,868  61,371,898   3,002,234  
 
Table 15 
























Within-day H 50,928   111,177   161   447  1.00 1.21 1.10 0.09 0.08 1.08  654,879  -  605,604   49,275  
Day-ahead H  2,168   4,771   223   621  1.00 1.31 1.10 0.09 0.08 1.09  851,493  -  784,673   66,820  
Month H  48   95   17   42  1.00 1.21 1.10 0.05 0.05 1.10  1,275,151  -  1,159,726   115,425  
Quarter H  16   30   8   18  1.00 2.65 1.50 0.67 0.45 1.57  1,672,401  -  1,107,524   564,878  
Year H  25   38   7   19  1.00 1.10 1.02 0.03 0.03 1.01 21,371,399  - 21,140,059   231,340  





Tables 16 to 21 show detailed results of the analysis for different clusters of connections taking into account the German definition of firm capacity: Tables 16 to 19 deal with 
connections to and from the German market areas; Table 16 (entry) and Table 17 (exit) with GASPOOL, Table 18 (entry) and Table 19 (exit) with NCG. The results are also shown 
separately for the borders of the German market areas with EU Member States (Table 20) and with non-EU countries (Table 21). In terms of the inefficiency ratio IER, the tables report the 
minimum, maximum, average (x), standard deviation (σ) and coefficient of variation (σ/!), and a capacity and runtime weighted average for each cluster of connection. All the 
calculations are based on auction data from PRISMA European Capacity Platform GmbH (2016). IER and costs are calculated as stated in Section 5.2. The number of conditional 
homogeneous groups and contained auctions refer to those groups that contain multiple auctions and allocated capacity as stated in Section 5.1. Unconditional refers to those auctions and 
homogenous groups on which the two conditions are not imposed. 
Table 16 
























NCG H 32,722 54,086 76 252 1.00 1.31 1.18 0.10 0.08 1.06 16,232 - 15,272 961 
Norway H 8,855 22,195 177 473 1.00 1.10 1.05 0.05 0.05 1.09 2,090,395 - 1,934,782 155,612 
Russia H 17,389 18,236 0 0 - - - - - - - - - - 
The 
Netherlands L 22,895 22,895 0 0 - - - - - - - - - - 
Sum  81,861 117,412 253 725      1.09 2,106,627 - 1,950,054 156,573 
 
Table 17 


























H 12,898 19,553 20 42 1.00 1.69 1.14 0.22 0.19 1.02 857,390 - 842,814 14,576 
Denmark H 12,159 12,159 0 0 - - - - - - - - - - 
NCG H 25,119 56,724 118 452 1.00 1.61 1.06 0.14 0.13 1.01 1,411,302 - 1,393,986 17,315 
The 
Netherlands 
H 8,790 14,477 40 80 1.00 1.48 1.06 0.13 0.12 1.04 93,478 - 90,156 3,322 
NCG L 8,736 16,470 231 462 1.00 1.22 1.21 0.05 0.04 1.05 150,177 - 142,825 7,352 































 H 27,586 36,293 2 4 1.07 1.08 1.08 0.01 0.01 1.08 49 - 45 4 
GASPOOL  H 25,119 56,724 118 452 1.00 1.61 1.06 0.14 0.13 1.01 1,411,302 - 1,393,986 17,315 
Austria  H 12,370 20,712 10 24 1.00 1.23 1.06 0.08 0.08 1.02 6,449 - 6,350 99 
Norway  H 16,746 24,377 161 322 1.00 1.00 1.00 - - 1.00 14,993,504 - 14,993,504 0 
The 
Netherlands 
 H 26,226 52,550 137 373 1.00 1.45 1.03 0.08 0.08 1.01 1,054,807 7,981 1,050,544 12,243 
Belgium / 
Luxembourg 
 H 19,343 25,799 2 4 1.00 1.12 1.06 0.06 0.06 1.11 - - - - 
GASPOOL  L 8,736 16,470 231 462 1.00 1.22 1.21 0.05 0.04 1.05 150,177 - 142,825 7,352 
The 
Netherlands 
 L 17,141 24,580 496 992 1.00 1.16 1.00 0.01 0.01 1.00 17,797,001 19,218 17,797,001 19,218 
Sum  153,267 257,505 1,157 2,633      1.00 35,413,289 27,199 35,384,255 56,231 
 
Table 19 
























Switzerland H 9,019 26,311 35 87 1.00 1.00 1.00 - - 1.00 1,149,916 - 1,149,916 - 
Czech 
Republic 
H 13,123 13,123 0 0 - - - - - - - - - - 
GASPOOL H 32,722 54,086 76 252 1.00 1.31 1.18 0.10 0.08 1.06 16,232 - 15,272 961 
France H 13,595 19,690 42 84 1.00 1.13 1.01 0.03 0.03 1.02 459,213 - 455,023 4,190 
Austria H 3,718 3,842 8 16 1.00 1.42 1.06 0.14 0.13 1.13 71,271 9,332 71,159 9,443 
The 
Netherlands 
H 35,082 39,510 121 242 1.00 13.23 1.16 1.12 0.97 1.21 206,377 47,345 206,133 47,589 
Belgium / 
Luxembourg 
H 17,610 17,610 0 0 - - - - - - - - - - 
The 
Netherlands 
L 8,183 17,297 51 135 1.00 1.21 1.03 0.07 0.07 1.02 176,781 16 174,162 2,635 




























Within-day H 298,392 418,522 327 830 1.00 13.23 1.08 0.69 0.64 1.06 1,540,315 49,998 1,523,800 66,514 
Within-day L 64,205 87,401 431 893 1.00 1.22 1.01 0.04 0.04 1.01 4,467,039 19,235 4,458,426 27,847 
Day-ahead H 13,256 18,671 206 625 1.00 1.42 1.08 0.12 0.11 1.04 652,867 14,659 644,352 23,173 
Day-ahead L 2,923 3,984 335 672 1.00 1.22 1.14 0.11 0.10 1.00 2,126,153 - 2,124,797 1,356 
Month H 285 420 35 100 1.00 1.69 1.16 0.21 0.18 1.01 1,688,423 - 1,673,491 14,932 
Month L 57 75 10 20 1.00 1.00 1.00 - - 1.00 3,993,695 - 3,993,695 - 
Quarter H 106 156 1 2 1.00 1.00 1.00 - - 1.00 3,405 - 3,405 - 
Quarter L 20 28 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Year H 258 315 7 16 1.00 1.58 1.19 0.20 0.17 1.02 291,557 - 286,435 5,122 
Year L 42 46 2 4 1.00 1.11 1.06 0.06 0.06 1.00 7,537,072 - 7,537,070 3 
Sum  379,544 529,618 1,354 3,162      1.01 22,300,526 83,892 22,245,471 138,947 
 
Table 21 
























Within-day  H 66,315 111,177 158 376 1.00 1.10 1.02 0.04 0.04 1.02 642,121 - 631,058 11,063 
Day-ahead  H 2,847 4,771 187 442 1.00 1.10 1.03 0.04 0.04 1.04 593,511 - 574,018 19,493 
Month  H 67 95 16 36 1.00 1.10 1.06 0.05 0.05 1.00 884,382 - 884,382 - 
Quarter  H 23 30 5 10 1.00 1.10 1.06 0.05 0.05 1.09 872,822 - 805,254 67,568 
Year  H 26 38 7 18 1.00 1.10 1.01 0.03 0.03 1.00 15,240,979 - 15,183,491 57,488 
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